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Swedish wage setting has undergone drastic changes during the last 10-15 years. While 
Sweden was known for its narrow wage distribution, wage differentiation and wage 
bargaining at the individual level has become leading principles among white-collar 
workers’ unions. The purpose of the present paper is to analyse the consequences of this 
wage policy shift. Wage differences have increased drastically among white-collar 
workers while remained constant or even decreased among blue-collar workers. We 
show that wage differentiation has had a strong effect on white-collar workers’ average 
wage, and caused a major increase in the wage gap between the aggregates of white-
collar and blue-collar workers. We also show that increases in the coefficient of variation 
of wages raise productivity in firms with many workers in that worker category. Last 
and foremost, we show that the transition to individual wage setting raises the scope for 
firms to set efficiency wages and we find support for the fair wage version of efficiency 
wage setting. The effects of higher wage/fair-wage rates were stronger in the late 1990s, 
when wage differentiation increased more, than in the early 2000s. 
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Introduction 
 
For many years, the Swedish labour market was characterised by 
centralised wage setting combined with very narrow wage differences in an 
international comparison. This was the result of the “solidaristic” wage 
policy that was a leading principle particularly among blue-collar workers’ 
trade unions. On top of that, the main political objective of the ruling Social 
democratic party was one of economic equality, manifested in a highly re-
distributive fiscal policy. The end result of this corporative policy was that 
the after-tax income differences became extremely small in Sweden when 
compared to those of other countries.  
Wage compression reached a peak in the first part of the 1980:s. Since 
then, and particular during the last 10 to 15 years, Sweden has experienced 
major changes in wage setting practices and in wage distribution. First, 
there has been a clear trend of decentralisation towards individual wage 
bargaining, particularly so among white-collar workers. Secondly, this 
decentralisation has been followed by drastic increases in wage differences 
among white-collar workers. This development is in sharp contrast to the 
situation among blue-collar workers for which unions have maintained very 
narrow wage differences, though the scope for individual wage setting has 
increased also among these groups. Another prominent feature of wages in 
Sweden is a considerable widening of wage differences across the 
aggregates of blue- and white-collar workers.  
In this paper we analyse the consequences of the transition to individual 
wage setting and to a policy of wage differentiation that characterized the 
white-collar unions after the mid 1990:s. These changes can be expected to 
raise the scope for efficiency wage setting among white-collar workers and 
we shall test to what extent this has been the case. Much research has 
focused on the distribution of wages within and between firms.
1 One 
problem with that approach from the point of view of efficiency wage 
setting is that wage comparisons to a large extent are between non-peers, 
which are not likely to have any major effects on work morale or incentives 
to perform well. To analyse the effects of comparisons with peers, we 
therefore analyse the effects of wage differentials within worker categories 
on firms’ productivity. Basically, this test amounts to examining if the 
prospects of better pay in worker categories having large wage differences, 
is conducive to firms’ productivity. Using a large worker-firm data set, we 
find that firms having a large number of workers in categories where wage 
differences are large perform better in terms of labour productivity and the 
                                                           
1 See e.g. Levine (1991), Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Hibbs and Locking (2000). 2 
change in wage policy has contributed significantly to raise productivity 
within firms. This suggests that workers’ effort is stimulated by the 
prospects of higher pay. These prospects for higher incomes may come as a 
result of the individual signalling strong work effort to the current 
employer or to potential outside employers. 
Apparently, the decentralisation of Swedish wage setting has increased 
the scope for efficiency wage setting. Is the increase in wage differences an 
expression for efficiency wage setting? We extend the analysis by studying 
the effects of fair wage setting on productivity. We argue that the perceived 
fair wage can be predicted from estimated Mincer equations that include, 
besides individual characteristics, also sector variables and the firm’s 
financial result per capital invested. We find that firms with many 
employees that receive a wage that is high compared to their perceived fair 
wage, are more productive than other firms. This supports the fair-wage 
version of efficiency wage setting and our empirical results suggest that 
much of the boost of Swedish productivity in the 1990s is due to changes in 
wage setting practices. 
 
 
Trends in Swedish wage formation 
 
After the peak in wage compression in the mid 1980s a period of wage 
differentiation followed among white-collar workers.
2 As seen in Figure 1, 
wage differences, here measured by squared coefficients of variation, have 
continued to increase and accelerated since the mid 1990:s in most sectors 
reported. Towards the end of the 1990:s, wage differences increased at a 
remarkable rate among white-collar workers in private sectors.
3 Notable is 
also that the coefficient has not increased and even decreased slightly 
among blue-collar workers in the private sector.
4 We also see large 
increases in wage dispersion among white-collar workers in the public 
health sector but not among workers in local government, belonging to 
blue-collar workers’ unions, outside the health sector.  
 
                                                           
2 The fairly modest increases in wage differences since the mid 1980:s have been 
documented in e.g. OECD (1996). 
3 These are workers in categories covered by the two white-collar worker confederations 
TCO and SACO. 
4 Workers in categories covered by blue-collar workers’ confederation, LO. 3 
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Source: Calculated from FIEFs data base.  
 
 
Increasing wage differentials among white-collar workers have driven up 
the economy wide variation of wages, which, as measured by the squared 
coefficient of variation, has increased from less than .12 in 1995 to more 
than .18 in 2002. It is of interest to see how much of this increase has taken 
place  within the worker categories and how much across the worker 
categories. In Figure 2 we show total wage dispersion and wage dispersion 
within the worker categories 1996-2002, the difference between these two 
curves is the variation of wages across worker categories. Wage dispersion 
has increased both within the worker categories as well as across the 
worker categories. The share of “within category” variation of the total 
variation has fallen slightly during the period, from .33 to .30. The large 
increases took place in the late 1990.s while wage dispersion was fairly 
stable in the early 2000’s.  
 4 














































Total variation Variation within categories.
 
Source: FIEFs data base. 
 
 Changes in relative wages: White- vs blue-collar 
workers. 
 
We have documented substantial changes in the distribution of wages 
within the group of white-collar workers while the distribution of wages 
among blue-collar workers has remained relatively stable. A crucial issue 
for the robustness of Swedish wage formation is if the average wage of 
white-collar workers has increased compared to the average wage of the 
blue-collar workers.  
Table 1 shows the average annual wage increases during the 1994-2003 
period. The average increase during the period 1994 to 2003 was 44 
percent for all workers, 47 percent for white-collar workers and 40 percent 
for blue-collar workers. In general, and for both groups of workers, wages 
increased more in the private sector than in the public. These differences in 
annual wage increases accumulate to large absolute wage differences 
between white- and blue-collar workers today. 
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All sectors               4.44  5.22         4.89 
Private sector              4.56                 5.33         5.00 





A relevant objection to such industry sector data is that structural 
changes, manifested in workers changing to better paid jobs, have taken 
place within firms and these changes could affect the data on wage 
increases. This has been stressed as a possible bias, particularly for the 
white-collar workers, and data such as those in Table 1 could therefore be 
misleading. To investigate the importance of the structural effects we 
compare wage increases of the individual white-collar worker categories 
with those of blue-collar worker categories rather than the increases within 
sectors. Figure 3 shows wage increases within 71 white-collar worker and 
blue-collar worker categories. Data are here limited to 1998-2002 since it is 
only for this period that we obtain comparable data series. 
It is clear from this figure that also when we account for the structural 
effects by focusing on wage increases among well-specified worker 
categories, white-collar workers’ wages have increased considerably more 
than blue-collar workers’ wages. Measured as the arithmetic mean, white-
collar workers’ wages increased by 17.6 percent (or 4.4 percent per year) 
during 1998-2002 while blue-collar workers’ wages increased by only 12.3 
percent (3.1 percent per year).
5 This implies that when we correct for 
structural effects, the differences between white-collar and blue-collar 
workers’ wages are even larger than those in Table 1, suggesting stronger 




                                                           
5 Since we take the arithmetic mean we have excluded those worker categories that in 
our data set contain less than 100 observations so as not to exaggerate the weight of 
small worker categories.  
6 Note though that periods differ because of data limitations. The data on sectors are 
based on the period 1994-2003 while data on worker categories are based on the period 
1998-2002. 6 
Do increasing wage differentials cause wage drift? 
 
Is there a connection between the considerably larger wage increases for 
white-collar workers reported in Tables 1 and Figure 3, and the increases in 
wage distribution among white-collar workers reported in for instance 
Figure 1? A possible explanation could be that since wages are upward 
flexible but downward rigid, a policy to raise wage differentials would 
cause a bias that raises also the average wage. It could also simply be 
viewed as a consequence of wage decentralisation that makes it possible to 
select workers that are underpaid compared to their productivity. These 
workers would then enjoy wage hikes while employers would find it hard 
to lower wages of workers that firms consider to be overpaid compared to 
their productivity. The latter group could find a necessary support in 



















Finally, the transition to individualised wage setting could imply that the 
scope for efficiency wage setting has increased, suggesting that firms 
would hesitate to reduce wages, which could reduce work effort but be 
inclined to raise wages so as to stimulate work effort. Irrespective of the 
reason, we shall refer to wage increases higher than those stipulated in the 
collective agreements as wage drift. 
Before we proceed to the empirical analysis, we shall make a few 
clarifications. We shall argue that one should expect any change in the 
wage distribution, be it an increase or a decrease, to tend to raise the 
average wage under wage rigidity. Assume for simplicity two workers in 
the same worker category, one having a high wage w
h and one having a low 
wage  w
l. Both wages are downward sticky. The average wage in this 
worker category is () 2
hl www =+ . Now assume a union with a policy that 
allows the firm to increase the wage difference between workers, which 
can be accomplished by raising the wage of the high wage earner and/or 
lower it of the low wage earner. However, if wages are downward sticky, 




hl h dw dw dw dw = +=> where 
dw
l =0 due to downward wage rigidity. Since the firm cannot lower the 
wage  w
l as a part of the strategy to increase the wage distribution, the 
average wage must rise.  
However, we also see that a strategy to reduce the wage differences 
would have a similar effect. To reduce the wage distribution we would like 
to lower the wage of the high wage earner and to raise it for the low wage 




hl l dw dw dw dw = +=>  
where dw
h =0 since downward wage rigidity now applies to the high 
wage earner. Also in this case we would find that the average wage rises. 
Hence, any measure to affect the wage distribution, be it an increase or a 
decrease, will tend to raise the average wage. 
To test if wage differentiation has caused wage drift, we first estimate a 
standard Mincer wage equations to which we add a variable to capture the 
effects of a shift in the policy of wage differentiation and individualized 
wage setting. This shift took place during 1996 and 2002. The question 
arises how to capture wage policy shifts.
7  A straightforward approach is to 
                                                           
7 Penetrating the wage agreement could be highly misleading, besides resource 
demanding, since a wage agreement may allow for wage differentiation and individual 
wage setting though this need not be implemented by the parties. A case in point is the 
LO-union “Svenska kommunalarbetareförbundet” organising blue collar workers in the 
local governments. This union opened for the possibility of individual wage setting and 
wage differentiation in much the same way as the white-collar unions. However, at the 
local level, the representatives of the Svenska kommunalarbetareförbundet have not 8 
consider the wage distributional outcome of the policy shift which had 
stabilized by 2002. To identify the worker categories for which the wage 
policy during the 1990:s has been one of wage differentiation, we specify 
the following continuous variable:  
 
{ } 2002, 1996, 1996, ln 1 / jj j j WD wdiff wdiff wdiff ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦                       (1) 
where  j WD    is the wage policy as represented by the change in wage 
differences of worker category j,  , tj wdiff , and which we measure by either 
the squared coefficient of variation or percentile ratios. For each category 
of workers, the variable captures changes in wage distribution between 
1996 and 2002. It is implicitly assumed that the outcome is in accordance 
with the objectives of the unions: As wage bargaining to a large extent is 
handed over to the individuals and to the firm’s representative, the union 
agrees to the outcome which, as shown above, implies heavily increasing 
wage differentials among white-collar workers.  
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if wdiff wdiff wdiff
WD
if wdiff wdiff wdiff
⎧ ⎡⎤ +− > ⎪⎣ ⎦ = ⎨
⎡⎤ +− < = ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩
                (2) 
 
which takes on a unity value if wage differentials have increased by 
more than 5 percent, else a zero value.
8 The remaining variables are 
standard Mincer type variables like educational levels (compulsory 
schooling only is the basis), seniority measured as number of years with the 
present employer,
9 seniority squared, age, age squared and gender. We 
have a sample of 2 305 534 observations
10 for year 2002 distributed over 
114 white-and blue-collar worker categories (professions).
11 For the wdiff 
variables there is, of course, only variation over these 114 observations. 
See Appendix for a description of data. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
made use of this possibility, which is manifested in a more or less unchanged 
distribution of wages among the union’s members.  
8 Five percent is chose arbitrarily but can, of course, easily be altered. 
9 For employees in the public sector, this variable is available only two years back.  
10 In the data set there are 2 261 514 individuals of which 65 439 have more than one 
job. 
11 Three-digit level. 9 
We shall run the following regression: 
 
,02 02 ,02 96 02 ii wX W D α βγ ε − =+ + +                                 (3) 
  
where  X02 is a vector representing the standard variables in the Mincer 
equation,  ,02 96 i WD −  is the change in the distribution of wages of the worker 
category to which worker i belongs and ε02 is the error term.
12  
In Table 2, Model 1 shows the results without any wage distribution 
variable and the results are much in line with our expectations. Model 2 
shows the results when adding the dummy variable in equation (2), based 
on the 90/10 percentile ratios, PRj. We see that the inclusion of the variable 
raises the explanatory power of the model as measured by the R
2 and that 
the estimated coefficient is significant.
13 Model 3 and Model 4 show the 
results when alternatives of the continuous variable in equation (1) are 
used. Adding the continuous wage distribution variable increases the 
explanatory power further compared to the results in Model 2. That the 
variable
d
j WD comes out significant and positive indicates that there is a 
positive effect on overall wages of a wage setting policy, as pursued by a 
large number of white-collar unions, that increases the wage differences 
among the employees. 
In the regression denoted Model 3, the continuous variable  j WD  in 
equation (1) is represented by the changes in 90/10 percentile ratios, PRj. 
The coefficient quantifies the effect of the wage differentiation policy. The 
estimated elasticity is .7, implying that if a union raises wage differences so 
that  j PR increases by 1 percent, then the average monthly wage of that 
group rises by .7 percent. Consider, for instance, the effects of an increase 
in wage differentials among the aggregate of white-collar workers. 
Between 1996 and 2002, the variable  90 10 PP  increased from 2.14 to 2.42 
implying that our variable j PR  increased by 13 percent. The estimated 
                                                           
12 We have a cross section variable for a single year, 2002, on the right hand side and 
we make no assumptions concerning the dynamics involved. Thus, by estimating 
equation (3) we test if the shift in wage policies that took place in many unions between 
1996 and 2002, as measured by the shift in wage distribution, affected the wages of year 
2002. In principle though, we expect the wage policies of 1996-2002 to affect also 
wages in the years following 2002. Since wage rigidity prevents wages from falling, the 
effects of wage policy shifts can be expected to be of a long run nature.  
13 We set the limit for a worker category that has pursued a wage differentiation policy 
somewhat arbitrarily at 5 percent. Alternatively, we tried a 10 percent limit, which also 
came out highly significant, but the overall explanatory power of the model was in this 
case lower. 10 
value, .7 then implies a general wage effect of .7*13=9.1 percent for white-
collar workers. Thus, ceteris paribus, more than 9 percentage points of the 
47 percent increase in white-collar workers wages during 1994-2003 could 
be ascribed the policy of wage differentiation. 
As documented in Figure 1, wage differentials among blue-collar 
workers have not increased and even fallen slightly during the same period. 
For worker categories with unchanged wage distributions, the narrowed 
wage distribution would lead to a drop in wages amounting to .14 percent. 
However, there is reason to question this latter result from a theoretical 
point of view. We argued above that efforts to raise wage differences are 
likely to add to a general increase and this effect has been strongly 
supported above. The reason is that wages are flexible upwards but rigid 
downwards. A lowering of wage differences cannot, however, be argued to 
lower wages in the corresponding way. To test for this, we performed a 
regression in which the distribution variable (1) was not allowed to take on 
a negative value but assumed a zero value for a worker category 
experiencing a drop in the distribution of wages. 
The results are shown in Model 4, and the increased R
2 indicates that this 
formulation of the variable adds to the explanatory power. We also find 
that the estimated coefficient now is higher, close to 1.00. This implies that 
of the 47 percent wage increases during 1994-2003, 13 percentage points 
could be ascribed the wage differentiation policy. Ceteris paribus, had the 
white-collar unions pursued the same policy as blue-collar unions, average 
white-collar workers’ wages would have fallen relative blue-collar 
workers’ wages. 
Finally, in Model 5, we estimate the model using the change of the log of 
the squared coefficient of variation, denoted CofV.
14 The squared 
coefficient of variation was used in Figure 1 to show the changes in the 
distribution of wages. The advantage of this variable is that it gives a better 
representation of the changes along the full range of the wage distribution 
while the variables used above only compare the wage of the 90:th 
percentile to that of the 10:th percentile. 
The explanatory power remains high. The estimated coefficient of CofVj 
is .21. Since the squared coefficient of variation of white collar workers 
increased by 80 percent (Figure 1) between 1996 and 2002, this estimate 
implies that 16 percentage points (80*.21) of the 47 percent total wage 
                                                           
14 To obtain this variable we substitute the squared coefficient of variation for the ratio 
of the 90:th percentile to the 10:th percentile in equation (1). We also set the negative 
values of the variable to zero, i.e. as in Model 4 we do not allow for a lowered wage 
differences to have a negative effect on the wage. 11 
increase can be ascribed the wage differentiation policy. This figure should 




Table 2. Regression results for 2002. Mincer wage equations 
with effects of shifts in wage policies.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 









































































































  .0867 
(260.78)     
WDj=PRj
     .7025 
(283.23) 
.9957 
(318.56)   
WDj=CofVj
         .2124 
(317.10) 
No of obs.  2305534  2305534 2305534 2305534 2305534 
Adj R
2  .3478 0.3665 0.3697 0.3753  .3750 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of wages in month-equivalents. t-ratios in 
parenthesis. Robust estimates. PRj means that wage differences are defined from 
percentile ratios and CofVj from the coefficient of variation. 
 
                                                           
15 As noted above, the wage policy variable only varies over the 114 worker categories 
while the other variables vary over the 2305534 observations. We also ran a regression 
with the mean wage of the category as the dependent variable and the wage distribution 
as in Model 5 as the explanatory variable. This yielded an estimated parameter of .22, 
i.e. very close to the estimated parameter in Model 5, .21. 12 
Above, we found that the shift in wage policies between 1996 and 2002 
affected the structure of wages in 2002. While we know that also low wage 
white-collar unions shifted to a policy of wage differentiation, it would still 
be relevant to ask if it is workers in the better paid categories that shifted to 
the policy of wage differentiation. This amounts to asking if it was the case 
that already in 1996 we had a similar wage structure as the one in 2002. To 
test for this, we may focus on the effects of the shift of wage policy on the 
individuals’ wage increases between these years. A further advantage is 
that we may make use of the information on wages also in the first year, 
1996. The results are presented in Appendix 2 and show that the results 
from these regressions on rate-of-change form generally support those on 
static form, Models 2-6. A policy of increased wage differentials, like that 




Productivity and the prospects of better pay 
 
It is possible that increased wages among white-collar workers reflect an 
increased scope for firms to stimulate productivity increases that 
correspond to the wage increases. This would suggest that productivity 
among the worker categories that have been exposed to increased wage 
differentials has increased. It would also imply that wages have been set 
above the market clearing level for these worker categories, which would 
worsen workers’ labour market situation. Finally, it could imply that 
increased wage differentials between white- and blue-collar workers is an 
adjustment to the market forces and that these differences adequately 
reflect differences in labour productivity between the groups. If this is the 
case, the new wage policy has raised the efficiency of the Swedish 
economy, though at the cost of reduced equality. 
Crucial to our interpretation of the results is if the increased wage 
dispersion has contributed to raise productivity. We have no information 
about the individuals’ productivity but with our worker-firm linked data set 
we can shed light on the effects of wage differentials within worker 
categories on firms’ productivity. In this section we test the hypothesis that 
firms with workers in categories where wage differences are large enjoy a 
higher productivity than firms with workers in categories with small wage 
differences. A flat wage structure yields low incentives to work hard since 
little is to be gained by the individual from being productive, while the 
contrary could be expected in a worker category where the wage structure 13 
is steep. The hypothesis we shall test is if productivity in a firm is higher 
the larger is the number of workers in categories where wage differences 










                        (4) 
where k wwd is a variable measuring the weighted wage difference among the 
worker categories represented in each firm k. With coefficients of variation 
for our worker categories  j CofV  (j=1…114) we can define for each firm a 
coefficient of variation weighted by the number of workers in each 
category. We assume that the higher is k wwd  in firm k the higher will be the 
level of productivity in that firm. For instance, a firm with a number of 
worker categories where wages differ a lot will get a high value of  k wwd , 
while a firm with a number of worker categories where wages do not differ 
much will get a low value of k wwd . If incentives to work hard and be more 
productive are higher in the first group, we should expect a firm with a 
large number of such worker categories to be more productive. 
Starting with a production function for a single firm we have the inputs 
of labor in efficiency units, 




ad d Qe L Kf ε
− = .                                             (5) 
 
ε is an error term uncorrelated with the inputs. To get at labor 
productivity, P, we divide both sides by total inputs of labor, L, to get  
 
11 /()
abd d PQ L e L KL f ε
−− == .                             (6) 
 
Effort is assumed to be a function of the relative wage, wwdk , and is 
specified as e= wwdk
α . In the empirical specification we differentiate labor 
into high skilled and low  skilled to get the estimable function 
 
0 lnP ln ln ln ln ln kt kt ks hkt lkt kt kt t wwd Z L L K L α γβ δ τ κ η ε =+ + + + + − + .      (7) 
 
where  a γ α = and k is an index of firms and t represent time. Zks is a dummy 
variable of firm k aimed at capturing specific properties of the sector to 
which firm k belongs. This would capture the major differences between 
for instance firms in service sectors and firms in different manufacturing 
sectors. The capital stock, Kk, is measured as the value of machinery and 
                                                           
16 Cf. Levine (1992). 14 
equipment, in firm k. Both these variables are included to control for the 
major determinants of productivity differences across firms, namely the 
factor supplies. Productivity is measured as the firm’s value added, divided 
by the total number of workers in the firm.  
In Table 3 we present six different specifications. Model 1 shows the 
results of an OLS regression with all variables measured in the same year, 
2002. The estimated elasticity of the weighted wage difference variable is 
.23 and is highly significant suggesting that wage differences in a worker 
category raise productivity significantly in a firm using workers in that 
category. Also the estimates of the parameters of the two factor supply 
variables come out highly significant.  
Could it be argued that firms’ productivity can affect the wage 
differences within a given worker category? If this is the case, wwdk would 
be affected by Pk and hence not be truly exogenous and our estimates 
would be biased. This would occur only if a productivity increase raises the 
dispersion of productivity that in turn would affect wage dispersion. Since 
we estimate the level of firms’ productivity as a function of the worker 
category weighted wage distribution, such an effect seems far from likely. 
Yet, should a problem in this respect exist, a remedy for such a source of 
estimation bias could be to estimate (7) using wwdk,t-1 rather than wwdk,t . It 
could also be the case that the productivity effect emerges with a lag of one 
year. The results when the firms’ productivity of the year 2002 is estimated 
as a function of weighted wage differences in 2001 are presented as Model 
2. The estimated parameter comes out somewhat lower than for wwdk,t, 
(.14), but is again highly significant and supports the general conclusion 
that productivity is favourably affected by wage dispersion. 
An alternative specification involves the use of instrumental variables. 
Wage dispersion is, however, a variable not easily instrumented. The only 
possible formulation is to instrument wwdk,t using wwdk,t-1. The correlation 
between these two variables is .75. In Model 3, we present the results of 
this IV-estimation. We see that the estimated parameter now is somewhat 
higher, .34. The estimate is again highly significant, supporting the 
hypothesis that the increased wage differences within many worker 
categories have affected productivity in a favourable way.  
 15 
Table 3. Estimating the effects of wage dispersion within 
worker categories on firms’ productivity. Estimated on double 
logarithmic form.  
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wwdkt-1    .1422 
(6.96)      
wwdfkt      .0303 
(3.77)    .0147 
(1.69) 





















































  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs.  3882 2901 2901 3348 3647 3348 
R
2  .3538 .3839 .3836 .3717 .3676 .3759 
Notes: Robust estimates. The correlation between wwdk,t and wwdk,t-1  is .75. 52 sector 
dummy variables have been used. 
 
 
How large is this estimated effect of wage dispersion on productivity? The 
two estimations based on wwdk,t yield elasticities of .23 and .34, 
respectively. Labour productivity in all sectors increased by approximately 
3 % per year between 1996 and 2002 while wage dispersion within 
categories increased by approximately 6.6 % per year. Our result in Model 
1 Table 3 would then suggest that 1.5 out of the 3 percent of the 
productivity gains should be ascribed increasing wage differences. This 
amounts to approximately half of the productivity increase. However, some 
caution should be taken in interpreting the results for such large changes in 
the wage dispersion. 
To test if other distributional variables affect productivity of the firm and 
to see if the weighted wage distribution within worker categories yields a 
robust estimate, we include in Table 3 the results from estimating three 16 
other models. We may first ask if the wage distribution of a worker 
category within the firm matters to the firm’s productivity. We may test if 
the fact that the wage distribution within the worker category affects 
productivity is because it reflects the distribution of the worker category 
within the firm. Instead of defining wage differences for the worker 











                                               (8) 
which differs from equation (4)  only in that the coefficient of variation 
now has an index k attached to indicate that it is the wage distribution of 
the worker category in firm k. The coefficient of variation for a worker 
category within a firm can only be calculated for some minimum number 
of workers in that category and we restrict this number to five.  
Model 4 shows the results when the variable specified in (8) is added and 
we see that the estimated parameter of the worker category wage 
distribution remains fairly stable and changes from a value of .23 (Model 1) 
to .21. The added variable, wwdf , comes out with the expected positive 
sign and is significant. 
Does the distribution of wages across worker categories in the firm 
matter? In Model 5 we have included a variable of the wage distribution in 
the firm, wdk , which measures the coefficient of variation across all 
employees in the firm. In line with Akerlof and Yellen one could argue that 
a wider distribution of wages in the firm would have a negative impact on 
productivity. One could argue that a large wage distribution also across 
worker categories would stimulate productivity to the extent that workers 
can switch between worker categories. More importantly is that this effect 
may capture the fact that many positions, particularly at the upper tail of 
the wage distribution, may be held by persons from different worker 
categories. For instance, many management positions may be held by 
economists, legal advisers or engineers. Hence, the wage distribution 
across worker categories could matter to workers’ incentives to perform 
well. One could also argue that some workers at the lower end would feel 
unfairly treated and lower productivity while those at the other end would 
be stimulated to work extra hard. The overall qualitative effect is therefore 
ambiguous. As seen in Table 3, Model 5, this variable yields a positive but 
low parameter estimate. We also see that our variable in focus, wwdk , is 
robust also with respect to the inclusion of the distribution of all wages in 
the firm. The estimated parameter is now .18. 
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Finally, in Model 6, we include both the variable as specified in (8) and the 
variable on firm’s wage distribution. We see that our estimated parameter 
of the variable representing the wage distribution across worker categories 
is slightly lower (.15) while the estimated parameter of wdk  is slightly 
higher. However, the variable wwdfkt, measuring the effects of the 
distribution of wages within the worker categories in firms, yields an 
estimate that is still significant but now only on the 10 percent level. 
 
Fair wage setting 
 
The estimations presented above suggest that wage differences affect 
productivity. The theoretical justification for including the variables is 
simply that wage differences stimulate workers’ effort. However, the wage-
productivity relation should be more directly tested against efficiency wage 
theory. In general, inter-industry or inter-firm wage differentials have been 
shown to persist and to be unrelated to human capital differences or be due 
to compensating differentials.
17 The more explicit tests of efficiency wage 
setting are based on tests of the relation between relative wages and 
performance, including work satisfaction, absenteeism, quits etc. and most 
studies yield results consistent with efficiency wages.
18 Levine (1992) 
differs from other studies by presenting a direct test of a crucial implication 
of efficiency wage theory, i.e. if the increase in productivity is large enough 
to pay for the higher wage costs. He finds that the elasticity of output with 
respect to wages was of the magnitude predicted by efficiency-wage 
theories. 
In this section we propose a slightly different test of the fair wage 
approach to efficiency wage setting. There are basically two major 
problems involved in the literature of empirical tests of fair wage models. 
One is that there is no definite notion of what constitutes the “fair” wage. 
Another, and more general problem, is that it may be hard to distinguish 
efficiency wage models from other models, notably the one that assumes 
that rent sharing affects wages. We argue that the available data and the 
suggested approach can handle these problems in an acceptable manner. 
When testing for efficiency wages, Levine (1992) uses the relative wage 
of the firm, which in his data set is the average wage in the firm divided by 
the wage paid by its three largest competitors in the product market, 
controlling for occupation. Since we have access to linked worker-firm 
                                                           
17 See, for instance, Krueger and Summers (1988), Groshen (1991) or Dickens and Katz 
(1987). 
18 Levine (1991), Akerlof et al (1988), Holzer (1989), Leonard (1987). 18 
data, the situation is quite different. It is assumed here that each individual 
worker in the firm forms a norm of her fair wage from three different 
sources that all seem acceptable. The first source of fairness is the worker’s 
own individual characteristics, like education, seniority at the firm, age etc. 
Perfectly in line with fair wage theorizing, a highly educated individual 
would feel unfairly treated if she were to be paid like an unskilled worker. 
Increasing seniority is also likely to add to the individual’s perception of 
the fair wage. Age does not necessarily add to the perceived fair wage. 
While experience increases in age, aging could also be argued to lower 
productivity and hence not necessarily add to the perceived fair wage. 
Gender is the most controversial argument and several alternatives are 
plausible and will be tested. Assume that there is a discriminatory gender 
effect. This could add to the norm and workers would not think of it as 
unfair if workers of either sex, ceteris paribus, received a lower wage than 
workers of the other sex. If both men and women think of a gender wage 
differential as fair, gender should then be a determinant of the fair wage 
that we shall predict.  
On the other hand, if discrimination is perceived of as truly unfair, then 
gender should not be included in the determinants of the relevant variable. 
Both alternatives will be tested. It is also plausible that the better paid 
gender, i.e. males, perceive a higher wage for males to be part of the fair 
wage while the worse paid gender, females, do not. 
The second determinant of fair wage concerns sector. Wage unfairness 
would be perceived if an individual would be paid less than the standard 
wage in the sector. The idea is that a norm for the sector is established and 
that workers expect high wages in some sectors and low wages in others. 
This implies that we need to account for sector specific effects.  
The third argument to affect the wage norm is the firm’s profitability. 
The individual would perceive the wage to be unfair if the rents of the firm 
were not reflected in her wage. This implies that rents would be 
incorporated into the perceived wage fairness. In this way, rent sharing 
becomes an integral part of efficiency wage setting. 
The first argument involves standard individual characteristics of the 
Mincer equation. The first step in our approach is therefore to estimate a 
standard Mincer equation to which we then add the other arguments, i.e. 
sector and firm profitability. We then define the fair wage as the one 
predicted by an estimated Mincer equation. Thus, we would get the 
predicted fair wage 
f
i w  of individual i as  
 
01 2 3 (/)
f
ii ii t wZ S R K α ααα ε =+ + + + %% % %  (9)   
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where the α % :s represents an estimated parameters of the respective 
variables, Zi is the vector of individual characteristics of individual i, Si is 
sector in which individual i is active, and (R/K)i is the firm’s result per 
value of capital in the firm where the individual works. 
According to fair wage version of efficiency wage theory, the relevant 
variable to the individual is wi/wi
f, i.e. the actual wage divided by the 
perceived fair wage. The hypothesis that we want to test is if this variable, 
in line with fair wage theory, affects productivity. To estimate the effects of 
this relative wage on productivity, we weight this variable for each firm k 











                             
(10) 
 
where nk is the number of workers in firm k. (10) is our weighted fair wage 
variable. Hence, if a firm has a large number of workers with high wages 
compared to their “fair” wage, we expect this firm to show a high 
productivity. To test for this, we estimate  
 
0 l n P l n l nl nl nl n kt kt ks hkt lkt k kt t fw S L L K L α γβ δ τ κ η ε =+ + + + + − +        (11) 
 
γ is the crucial parameter of interest. However, before proceeding to 
estimation, we need to be convinced that productivity P does not affect our 
right hand side variable fw. One could argue, in line with the rent sharing 
hypothesis, that productivity, our dependent variable, could affect the 
results per capital invested in firms and hence our explanatory variable fw. 
Given the determination of this variable as in (10), this does not seem 
likely. Nevertheless, we test the correlation between Pk and (R/K)k and find 
that this is not significant.
19 We therefore proceed towards estimating (11). 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating (11) for the years 1999 and 2002. 
We select these years since 1999 was a year when wage differences 
increased a great deal, suggesting that this could be because firms’ wage 
setters expected this to give rise to large productivity effects, while 2002 
was a year when wage differences did not increase. This could suggest 
major differences in the estimated parameters γ of the two years. 
In Model 1, the fair wage is based on an estimation of the Mincer 
equation using education, seniority, age and gender as the determinants of 
the fair wage. Including gender in the estimation of the Mincer equation 
that we use for predicting the fair wage, implies that a gender wage gap is 
considered fair by the individual workers. We see that for both years, an 
                                                           
19 The coefficient of correlation is .0018. 20 
increase in the individual’s wage relative the fair wage has a positive effect 
on the firm’s productivity. The effect differs a great deal and is 
considerably stronger, .90, in 1999 than in 2002, .45. The effect is thus only 
half as strong in 2002. The fact that firms and the individual workers 
determined the wages and that there were major increases in wage 
differences in the late 1990:s but not in the early 2000:s is consistent with 
the fact that the estimates are higher in 1999. Thus, the results suggest that 
there was a higher “pay-off” to an increase in the individual’s wage relative 
the “fair” wage in this year than in 2002.  
In general, alternative specifications of the “fair” wage could improve 
the fit of the model. That would imply better determinations of what 
represents the fair wage. As mentioned above, the gender variable is not at 
all an obvious determinant of the fair wage. A “feminist’s” view would be 
that the gender wage gap should not be an integral part of the fair wage 
and we want to test if this is the case. Model 2 is therefore based on an  
 
Table 4. Estimating the effects of efficiency wage setting. 
Dependent variable is firms’ productivity. Estimated on double 
logarithmic form. Robust estimates. 
 








































































































































No of obs.  3040  3882 3040 3882 3040 3882 3023 3882 
R
2  .4159  .3537 .4182 .3547 .4185 .3551 .4328 .3679 
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estimation of the Mincer equation that excludes the gender variable as a 
determinant.
20 We note that the fit of the model now is slightly better in 
both years suggesting that the gender wage gap is not a part of the 
perceived fair wage. In general, the individual does not expect a gender 
wage gap to be fair.  
This, however, is something that could differ across the two genders. 
Men, who generally are better paid than women, could very well be 
assumed to include a gender wage gap in their perception of the “fair” 
wage while women would not. In Model 3, we test for such a difference. 
We thus let the perceived fair wage of men include the estimated parameter 
times the value of the dummy variable for men, while for women the 
perceived fair wage includes the parameter multiplied by the average value 
of men and women. Would this specification further improve the fit of the 
model? We see that it does. The R
2 rises slightly, from .4182 to .4185 in 
1999 and from .3547 to .3551 in 2002, when we allow gender to affect the 
determination of men’s perception of the fair wage while women’s 
perception of what constitutes a fair wage is assumed unaffected.  
These results suggest that there are slight deviations in the perceptions of 
what constitutes a fair wage. It is encouraging that when the gender 
variable is neutralised, as in Model 2, this yields a better fit than when it is 
included since this suggests that it is not in general considered “fair” that 
gender should affect the wage rate. On the other hand, Model 3 suggests 
that men still to some extent perceive gender to be a part of the 
determination of the fair wage. 
Finally, in Model 4, we add the wage distribution variable analysed in 
Table 3 to see if this variable exerts an independent effect on productivity. 
We see that for both 1999 and 2002, a wider wage distribution as well as a 
larger wage/fair-wage ratio raises productivity. The added wage 
differentiation variable (wwd) is for 2002 now .19 while in the regressions 
in Table 3 it varied between .15 and .23 depending on specification. For 
1999, the estimate is also .19. The estimate of the parameter of the 
wage/fair-wage variable remains relatively stable for 1999 (changes from 
.93 to .91) and for 2002 drops from .47 to .39.  
 
 
                                                           
20 This means that we neutralise the gender effect. Assume γ )  to be the estimated 
parameter of the gender dummy variable in the Mincer equation. In determining the 
perceived fair wage we then include instead the value γ )  times the average value of the 
dummy variable for men and women (1.5). 22 
Concluding remarks 
 
The strong trend towards wage setting at the individual or local level 
among white-collar workers has been followed by increases in wage 
dispersion both within worker categories as well as across worker 
categories. Clearly, when local wage setters received more influence over 
wages, wage dispersion among white-collar workers increased and this 
pushed average white-collar workers’ wages up. Wage differentials 
between white- and blue-collar workers increased. While these wage 
increases may have caused higher unemployment among white-collar 
workers, a favourable effect is the positive effects on labour productivity. 
Our results suggest that these productivity gains come about via more effort 
arising partly from prospects of better pay and partly from a higher wage 
relative the perceived fair wage, i.e. efficiency wage setting. The elasticity 
of productivity with respect to increases in the wage/fair-wage ratio seem 
to have diminished in 2002 as compared to 1999 which is as expected since 
the late 1990s was a period of drastically increasing wage differentials. 
Tests indicate that the relation between high relative wages and 
productivity is not due to rent sharing. 
Twenty years of decentralisation of Swedish wage setting has implied 
that firms locally can affect the wage of the individual employee and firms’ 
scope for efficiency wage setting has increased in a way previously not 
experienced.
21 Much of the changes towards decentralised wage setting has 
been motivated by employers’ need for wage differences that should 
encourage the individual employee to invest in skills and to take own 
initiatives which is much in line with efficiency wage theory. It is 
conceivable that the extreme wage compression in Sweden up to the mid 
1980s had adverse effects on work incentives and our results show that the 
wage differentiation, particularly in the late 1990s, triggered major effects 








                                                           
21 Still, wage bargaining is a fact of life. It can easily be shown that a bargaining model 
with efficiency wage setting gives rise to higher unemployment than a bargaining model 
without efficiency wage setting or an efficiency wage model with no bargaining. See for 
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All data are taken from FIEFs data sets, which, in turn, derive from 
Statistics Sweden. To Statistics Sweden’s annual wage investigations has 
been added wage data from “Kommunförbundet”, Landstingsförbundet” 
and “Svenskt Näringsliv”.  
 
Wages cover the period 1995-2002 and includes a basic fixed wage 
(salary), any extra wage income like bonuses, any compensation for 
inconvenient work hours or compensation while “on duty”, the value of 
fringe benefits, compensations in cash etc. All wages are expressed in 
month equivalents. White-collar workers cover the TCO/SACO areas and 
blue-collar workers the LO area.  
 
Seniority is measured as number of years with the present employer. 
 
Capital stock is measured as total value of machinery and inventories in the 
firm.  
 
Share of highly educated is the number of employees with at least two 
years of college education as a share of all employees. 
 
The total number of individuals is 2 261 514 and covers employees on 
permanent as well as temporary positions and includes entrepreneurs with 
employment conditions according to agreements. The number of positions 























Consider the Mincer model for year t 
 
11 ijt t t ijt t jt t wa X W P γ βε −− =+ + +                                                         (A1)               
(4) 
and for the year t-1 
 
111 1221 ijt t t ijt t jt t wa X W P γ βε −−− −−−− =+ + +                   (A2) 
 
where we allow for changes in the parameters of the Mincer variables. 
Subtracting (A2) from (A1) we get 
 
11 1 1 1 1 2 2 () ijt ijt ijt t ijt t ijt t jt t jt ww w a X a X W P W P α ββε − − − −−−−− ∆=− = + − + − + ,     (A3) 
 
where  1 tt α γγ − =−  and where t=2002 and t-1=1996. We include the gender 
and age variables (though gender is unchanged between the years and age 
differs additively) so as to allow for any parameter change during the six-
year period. We lack data for seniority preceding 1996 as we do for 
changes in wage differences preceding 1996 (i.e. the variable  2 jt WP − ). The 
major changes in wage distribution took place after 1996. For this reason 
we instead include a constant α also in this specification. We include 
changes in education represented by dummy variables for individuals that 
increased their level of education during the period.  
The results of estimating the model on this rate-of-change form are 
presented in Table A1. As is to be expected, the models can explain 
considerably less of the total variation in the change in wages as compared 
to the wage level (as in Table 2). Notable, however, is that when we add 
the wage differentiation variable based on the percentiles 90 and 10, as in 
Model A2, the adjusted R
2 rises considerably, from less than .05 to above 
.07. The explanatory power rises further, to above .08, when the coefficient 
of variation is included instead as in Model A3. 
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Table A1. Results for wage changes 1996-2002. Mincer wage 
equations. Dependent variable is the log of wage changes in 
month-equivalents. t-ratios. Eduij represents individuals that 
have changed their education from level i to j during the period 
where 1=no high school, 2=2 years high school, 3=3 years high 
school, 4=less than 3 years university education, 5=at least 3 
years university education, and 6= PhD. 
 
  Model A1  Model A2  Model A3 













































































































































j j PR WP =    
2.3349 
(176.42)  
j j CofV WP =     
.5711 
(209.87) 
No of obs.  1268517 1268517 1268517 
Adj R
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